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JOHN W. HALL
Justified or not, this picture of the Sengoku age is paradoxical to the historian. For, in proportion to the emphasis placed upon the supposedly hopeful or "progressive" signs in Sengoku society, the work of Murdoch's "great trio" is minimized and the daimyo are less admired. For when it is discovered that Hideyoshi, after his unification of Japan, did not complete these trends, and, as one recent writer puts it, did not "respond with a plan of integration which would have placed Japan on the threshold of progress as a modern state and world power,"' the question arises "Why not?"
The answer most frequently given is that Hideyoshi was a spokesman of conservative feudal interests. Nobunaga's reduction of Sakai, Hideyoshi's slamming of the door in the face of those who would have followed him out of the peasantry, and Ieyasu's purported return to outgrown feudal institutions have been held against Murdoch's heroes. Japanese historians have gone further. Suzuki Ryoichi has called the social settlement under Hideyoshi a "betrayal" perpetrated by a victorious coalition of feudal groups against the struggling nomin. In his words, "The new absolute feudal hegemony . . . suppressed the further anti-feudal struggle of the peasantry .... "6 What are we to believe: that the dark ages were dark or bright, that the "great trio" were heroes or traitors?
The answer to this question lies in the study of the daimyo who emerged as the new political masters of Japan and of the methods by which they gained and governed their domains. Of all the institutional products of the Ashikaga period, the daimyo were without question the most significant. A study of the Ashikaga period in the light of the evolution of the daimyo as the representative figures of Japanese local and national government, rather than as individual heroes, can illuminate this enigmatic chapter of Japanese history, divorced from the labels of ge-koku-j0 or of hero-worship. Conversely, it is only as we trace the institutional origins of the daimyo back into the Ashikaga period that their true significance as the molders of local government in Tokugawa Japan can be understood.
In recent years, Japanese historians such as Nagahara Keiji, Sat6 Shin'ichi, Toyoda Takeshi, It6 Tasaburo, and Nakamura Kichiji, have directed serious attention to the institutional origins of the daimyo. Although these scholars have not always agreed upon the interpretation of their data, their studies have given us a useful periodization and nomenclature for this field of study. Basically, what these men have done is to make a series of cross-sectional analyses of the structure of Japanese local administration at four points in time from, roughly, the middle of the fourteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century. This admittedly artificial segmentation of the continuum of social change has provided the data for the postulation of four ideal daimyo types, each building successively upon the institutions of the previous, and each embracing larger and more effective areas of hegemony. They are: (i) the shugodaimyo type which characterize the period from mid-fourteenth century to somewhat beyond the Onin wars, approximately until the 1490's, (2) the sengoku-daimyo type which emerged before 1500 and continued into the 1560's and 1570's, (3) the shokuh5-daimyo type which came into being under Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and lasted until the early seventeenth century, and (4) the kinsei-daimyo type which became dominant during the Tokugawa period and matured by the end of the seventeenth century.7 Each of these types exhibited certain distinctive patterns of social and political organization within several levels of government: (i) the level of ultimate authority and sanction for the exercise of legal or administrative powers, (2) the level of power organization among the local elite, and (3) the level of relationships between local power holders and the various subordinate groups of local inhabitants.
The possibility that the military confusion of the Sengoku period masked many fundamental and even revolutionary social and political changes has not been ignored completely by historians. The traditional emphasis upon the "reunification" of Japan has implied the adoption of certain new practices of military and political organization. G. B. Sansom has laid considerable stress on the shift in social organization from clan to family and on the changing nature of feudal law.8 K. Asakawa has studied the evolving patterns of land tenure and fiscal administration.9 What has been lacking has been a recognition of the full magnitude and variety of the institutional changes which accompanied the emergence of the modern daimyo and the capacity to describe these changes comprehensively. A structural study of the daimyo domain provides the materials for such an integrated treatment.
It may be argued, of course, that a single pattern of daimyo evolution cannot possibly emerge from the diverse local histories of the scattered regions of Japan. And it is unquestionably true that, in terms of timing and pattern, social change in Japan has shown considerable regional variation. On the other hand, enough work has been done by Japanese historians to show that there is a "main stream" of daimyo evolution illustrated by the progression of the four ideal types described above. The following amplification of the institutional origins of the modern daimyo combines this recent work of Japanese historians with data taken from the case study of a single locality: the province of Bizen, which occupies today the southeasterni third of Okayama Prefecture. The history of the rise of the modern daimyo in Bizen follows rather closely the main stream of daimyo development. Admittedly, it contrasts with the pattern in some of the fringe areas of the Japanese islands, as those familiar with Asakawa's work on Satsuma will recognize.10 But the Bizen case is close to the norm 7 For a selection of the more accessible and generalized writings of these historians see: Nagahara Keiji, "Shugo ry5kokusei no tenkai" ["The Changing Structure of the Shugo Domain"], Shakaikeizaishigaku, XVII (Feb. 1951 Japan (New Haven, 1929) .
' 0Satsuma, the scene of the Asakawa's study of the Iriki house documents, is one of the few regions in which a shugo family of Kamakura origin, the Shimazu, managed to retain its power and continue as a daimyo under the Tokugawa hegemony.
of the process as it unfolded throughout central Japan, and it was this area which provided leadership both in social change and political unification.
Bizen, one of the original 66 provinces established in the eighth century, had a history of relatively stable administration with strong ties to the center of court influence at Kyoto. Comprising an area of about 670 square miles, it supported a population of just under 400,000 persons by the end of the seventeenth century. During the Tokugawa period, it w.s totally dominated by the daimyo of Okayama, hereditarily assigned to the house of Ikeda. Although Bizen did not provide the base of support for a major shugo-daimyo power during the early Ashikaga period, it eventually gave rise to an indigenous daimyo family, the Ukida, which gained national prominence under Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. The Ukida were succeeded by the Ikeda during the early years of the Tokugawa hegemony, and it was the latter house which perfected the institutions of the modern daimyo in Bizen.
The shugo-daimyo
The wars of the dynasties during the last half of the fourteenth century witnessed the emergence of a group of powerful local families bearing the title of shugo and given appointment by the Ashikaga shogun. These shugo were essentially military governors, for they served both as the military subordinates of the shogun and exercised the remaining civil functions of the former imperial provincial governors.11 These military governors were, in effect, the institutional forerunners of the later daimyo, although in only rare instances, such as the Shimazu, Otomo, or Date, did shugo families manage to perpetuate their power to become daimyo at a later age.
The units of shugo jurisdiction and appointment were provinces (kuni) such as Bizen, over which they exercised prescribed legal powers vested in them by the shogun, who derived his authority in principle from the emperor. In most provinces, however, a sizeable discrepancy existed between the jurisdictional authority of the shugo and the area of their enforceable authority. The imperial bureaucratic system was nearly dead, but the system of military allegiances and controls had not yet fully taken its place. This, in essence, was the weakness of the Ashikaga policy, and not Murdoch's turncoats and mediocrities.
Bizen, during the early Ashikaga period, was divided into some I05 shoen units, administered under a confusing welter of resident and absentee proprietorships. Of these, 4 were held by the imperial family, 4 by court families, 26 by centrally located temples or shrines, and I2 by the Hosokawa family whose head served as deputy shogun (kanrei). Thirty or more small shoen were held, probably under resident proprietorships, by military families, most of them former jit3.'2 One of these houses, the Matsuda, briefly held the appointment of shugo of Bizen, but lost the title to a stronger power, the Akamatsu of the neighboring province of Harima. The Akamatsu served as shugo of Bizen for most of the years from I364 to I522.13 From almost any point of view the basis of Akamatsu power was precarious. In Harima, the family held I2 shoen in varying degrees of completeness, and other holdings were scattered over 6 other provinces. In its home province the Akamatsu may have controlled a tenth of the land and counted a majority of the bushi families as their allies or vassals. But the interests of absentee court and religious proprietors were still evident in the province. In Bizen the Akamatsu held but two of the I05 shoen, so that their authority rested almost entirely on the uncertain submission of the Matsuda house which dominated western Bizen and on the services of the Urakami, who, as jitO of one of the Akamatsu sh6en, fought for a precarious hold over eastern Bizen. To both of these houses, the Akamatsu assigned titles as deputy-military-governors (shugodai).
The existence of a gap between the area of enforceable authority and that of legal jurisdiction accounts for the importance the shugo placed upon their participation in the affairs of the Ashikaga shogunate and the reliance they placed upon the shogun's support in their own local affairs. It is an historic irony, however, that this reliance upon central rather than local sources of power was to be their undoing. The necessity the shugo felt for the legal authority of the shogunate and the court involved them more and more in the affairs of the capital. But as the shugo families turned their attention to Ky6to, they found the task of organizing and holding their territories increasingly beyond their means. The network of relatives and trusted vassals on whom they depended became scattered and divided in loyalties and interests. Neither the force of the oath of allegiance nor family solidarity based on primogeniture had been perfected."4 Competition on the national stage drew the shugo and their armies away from their power bases, so that they gradually lost their hold over the lower echelons of their own subordinates. Real initiative in the provinces began to pass to another level of local families, very often to the shugodai who had been able to put down stronger roots in the local soil. In the Onin war, the shugo families exhausted themselves opposing each other, so that nearly all disappeared or became the puppets of their stronger vassals. Between I467 and the I530's, the far-flung jurisdictional territories of the shugo broke into fragments, and a second wave of families of local origin inherited the pieces.
The sengoku-daimy6
In Bizen, the collapse of the Akamatsu between I483 and I522 brought the two shugodai families, the Matsuda and Urakami, to the fore. Theirs was not a simple case of inheritance from the Akamatsu, however. The territories controlled by these emerging sengoku-daimy65 were of a new and more rugged type. In them, the gap between legal and effective control had been wiped away, or, more correctly, it had become impossible to lay claim to jurisdictional authority unsupported by actual military force.
In the region of Bizen today, the remains of over 200 small hilltop fortifications, dating from the Sengoku period, stand as evidence of a new kind of political-military organization based on entrenched military power.15 At the bottom of Bizen elite society, small bushi landowners, asserting themselves in their immediate neighborhoods, built up small but strongly consolidated units each consisting of a fort and surrounding fiefs, unifying within the protection of the fort the many myosha, or cultivators, of these fiefs. These were the building blocks of the power structure of a new warnng society, the individual leader of which was the mounted fighter, or ki.
Such leaders were gradually and systematically organized into larger valley-wide hierarchies of loyalties under the leadership of the former shugodai during the wars of the Sengoku era. But while it was primarily upon military coercion that the former shugodai relied for their regional hegemony, they utilized as well the residue of prestige and legal authority which remained from their previous official titles.
In Bizen, two competing centers of military power came into existence led by the Matsuda and Urakami.'6 Each of these longstanding powers had entrenched themselves in mountain fastnesses from which they could extend control over the lesser military houses within small but defensible geographical regions. The Matsuda, controlling the Asahi River valley of western Bizen, counted 350 ki among their vassals in the I490's and could muster 5000 men in emergency. Their domain, or, rather, sphere of influence, was an area of relatively fluid boundaries including 20 major tributary-valley forts and many smaller ones. The Urakami sphere of power which embraced the Yoshii River of eastern Bizen did not reach full maturity until the I550's. By that time it consisted of some i72 separate fiefs (chi'gydchi) held by 59 major vassals.'7 Each vassal was enfeoffed directly, and few held less than what was later the equivalent Of 500 koku. Thus we can visualize the majority of these 59 vassals as petty castle-holders, each possessing his own followers and land-holdings of long standing. Sengoku-daimyd, such as the Urakami and Matsuda, were in effect leaders of separate coalitions of local families (generally referred to as kokujin), most of which had grown up within the shoen system as jito. These coalitions had been drawn together over a long period of time and were characterized by a heavy reliance on kinship and marriage relationships in addition to bonds of vassalage and enfeoffment for purposes of solidarity. This was particularly true of the Matsuda, the majority of whose supporters were heads of branch families or were linked to the Matsuda by direct marriage ties.18
As a general rule, at least until after I530 or so, the daimyo of the Sengoku period did not acquire jurisdiction over territories which approached in size those of the shugo. But their grip was more secure and complete. Their holdings and those of their followers were closely compacted into contiguous domains which, in most instances, had been won or defended in battle. ITus the distinction between boundaries of legal jurisdiction and outright control had been largely obliterated. Within this area, the complex division of rights which characterized the shoen system had given way to the holding of land in fief. By now the absentee interests of courtiers or distant temples had been almost entirely squeezed out. In other words, the vertical lines of authority and control had been pulled short and taut. Very little administrative and almost no fiscal contact existed between the provinces and Kyoto. The individual daimyo domains were essentially independent. Within them the power and authority relationships consisted of a hierarchically structured system of allegiances in which military service was exchanged for grants of fief. Furthermore, the exercise of the functions of government, coincided with those relationships. It is this situation which can be compared most closely with the model of decentralized feudalism in Europe.
The shokuhJ-daimya In Bizen as elsewhere, no sooner had the new local powers consolidated the domains from which they could draw extensive military and economic support, than they began to contest for territory among themselves. Beginning during the I530's and reaching a crescendo after I560, the struggle raged for local and, eventually, national hegemony. In most locales-and this was true of Bizen-the original sengoku-daimyd did not survive the devastating wars of the I530's to I560's. Again they were replaced by a new group of families which showed still greater capacities for leadership and organization under the strenuous requirements of warfare. This was the heyday of ge-koku-j6, when, according to the traditional view, military upstarts displaced their legitimate superiors by treachery and trickery. In actuality, however, it is clear that these new leaders, who inherited the domains of their former lords and proceeded to carve out even larger territories, built their successes upon certain clearly defined institutional advances.
The basic weakness of the daimyo of the early Sengoku period was that, as time went on, their vassals became increasingly powerful and insubordinate. The new daimyo of the late Sengoku period were able to impose a sufficiently effective control over the fighting men and the resources of their domains, a special capacity that kept them relatively free of such centrifugal forces. This capacity was well illustrated in the growing concentrations of military and economic might which the new daimyo assembled in the great castle headquarters of their domains.
In Bizen, this new stage of organization was achieved by the military leader Ukida Naoie.Y The history of Ukida's rise is remarkably similar to that of the betterknown military figures of this age, such as Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, or Ikeda Terumasa, who eventually took over Bizen. In I545, Ukida Naoie, a minor vassal of the Urakami, was given command of a small fort on Bizen's sea frontier. He was assigned 30 men for its defense and a small fief nearby. Here were the in-gredients of a new power structure which was eventually to take over all of Bizen and parts of neighboring provinces. There were two important innovations in authority relationships. Ukida Naoie was in effect the commander of his 30 men. In the words of the day, he was their yorioya (parent) and they his yoriko (children). Between them was a chain of command relationship differing fundamentally from the previous marriage or oath of vassalage tie. Secondly, these men were maintained on Naoie's fief. They lived in his castle and lived off his land which adjoined it. Thus the degree of dependence between these men and their leader was more complete.
As Naoie and his men fought their way out of the corner of Bizen, he added to his fiefs and began to set out some of his own yoriko as commanders of outlying castles. About half of his original band became unit commanders (kumigashira) possessing their own vassals, and five of these became major castleholders within Naoie's territory. The granting of such privileges involved certain risks which a leader like Naoie must have recognized. In a sense, it meant a return to the older form of less dependent lord-vassal status. But it was unquestionably necessary because Naoie had not yet developed a sufficiently effective centralized control over his expanding territory. As it was, Naoie worked hard to maintain his dominance over his men, rotating commands frequently, and periodically pulling back his major vassals to his own castle headquarters. Moreover, he maintained a large force of troops under his own direct command, so that the military center of gravity of his holdings was clearly located in his main castle. Thus Naoie moved his own headquarters to successively larger castles until in I573 he entered Okayama castle, newly built to house his swelling corps of fighters. By this time Naoie was mustering from Io,ooo to 15,000 men in his frequent campaigns. His fiefs extended over nearly a tenth of Bizen.20 Although he was nominally still vassal to the head of the Urakami house, he was beginning to have ambitions of his own.
After the middle of the sixteenth century, while local leaders such as Ukida Naoie were perfecting strongly centralized military organizations within their own territories, the older regional lords, such as the Matsuda or Urakami, held to their systems of extended coalitions of independently enfeoffed vassals. Continuing to rely on the presumed invulnerability of their mountain castles, they came to depend more and rhore upon their own subordinates to do their fighting. As a consequence, they were obliged to permit their vassals a dangerous rate of growth and freedom. During the I56o's and the I570's, the many kokujin vassals of the Urakami were showing signs of restlessness. It was now increasingly possible for such local families to make alliances outside of Bizen with neighboring powers such as the M6ri to the west, the Amago to the north, or even with Oda Nobunaga, who had begun to push westward from Ky6to. By this time, however, the head of the Urakami house could only depend upon Ukida Naoie to keep his restless vassals in line. While Urakami Munekage sat in his mountain citadel of Tenjinyama, the Ukida reduced, one after another, the tributary-valley powers of the Urakami vassals for disciplinary reasons. One by one, the small hilltop castles of this area were put to the torch. In I568, the Matsuda were wiped out under Ukida Naoie's generalship. While this was going on, the Urakami, depending on the loyalty of the Ukida and other close vassals, failed to expand their landed and military resources to keep pace with the process of consolidation. By I573, when UJkida Naoie moved into Okayama castle, he, not Urakami Munekage, commanded the majority of Bizen's military forces, and his castle at Okayama was larger than that of his overlord. In I577, Naoie, using the pretext of a succession dispute in the Urakami house, stormed Tenjinyama and displaced his lord. Bizen was now unified under his command. Within a generation, the network of small hilltop casdes which had stood for the independently enfeoffed kokulin had been superseded by the consolidated domain commanded by the Ukida at Okayama.
The Ukida domain, centering on Okayama, was typical of those brought under control by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. It rested, not only on a generation of military conquest, but on extensive redistribution of land rights and simplification of tenures. Productive land was being systematically surveyed and converted to a uniform measure (kokudaka). Naoie held some 400,000 koku. His retainers, or housemen (kashin), were organized in chain of command fashion. A band of some I400 retainers of officer status were organized into I4 groups (or kumi) each headed by a trusted commander.2' Seven of these were set up as subsidiary castle holders guarding the frontiers of Bizen and the approaches to Okayama. Each held lands producing over io,000 koku. In other words, they were embryonic daimyo. But they were obliged to reside in Okayama. The unit commanders (kumi-gashira) of lesser status were officers who commanded their men on a yorioya-yoriko basis. This was essentially an army type of organization in which there was a minimum identity of family to locality or dependence upon family ties for loyalty. A significant source of the daimyo's power in this system was the balance between daimyo's lands and those of his retainers. In the Ukida domain, some 25 per cent of the territory was now held directly by the daimyo as chokkatsuchi.22 This made the maintenance of standing mercenary divisions controlled by the daimyo (the daimyo's own kumi) possible and useable to maintain loyalty if needed. Such troops were frequently paid, not in fiefs, but in rice stipends.
From the point of view of local government in Bizen, two significant developments accompanied the consolidation of the Ukida domain. First of all, despite the Ukida acquisition of complete proprietary and administrative authority over Bizen on the basis of conquest, this conquest was capped eventually by the acquisition of legitimacy from higher authority. In Bizen, this legal authority was acquired, first from the M6ri who had secured legitimacy as shugo from the Ashikaga shogun, then from Oda Nobunaga whose control of the capital and of the powers of the shogunate gave him de facto if not de jure legitimacy. When Ukida Naoie died in I580, his son secured confirmation of his status in Bizen by receiving Nobunaga's red seal certificate (shuinjo), a token of complete legal jurisdiction over Bizen under the new structure of sovereignty emerging in Ky6to.23 The use of the shuinja as the capstone of a new national political order was further extended by Hideyoshi.
The other important development related to the more general structure of society. 6I-63. But the technical study of the Because of the disappearance of the shoen and the weakening of the decentralized system of enfeoffment, it became increasingly common to find the inhabitants of the domain, both samurai and commoners, treated as functional groups and classes. The Ukida band of retainers, as we have seen, was not a cluster of individually enfeoffed and locally independent vassals, the typical organizational pattern for the sengoktdaimyo. It was organized into kumi within which the daimyo's men were assigned statuses which were commonly differentiated according to military rank and function.24 Thus the family-based categories of vassal classification-cadets (kamon), or vassals (fudai)-became less important than military rank terminology-generals (kara), group commanders (bangashira), unit commanders (kumigashira), officers (heishi), petty officers (kachi), or foot soldiers (ashigaru). Status, once achieved, was still largely inheritable, but there was also considerable mobility, partly because of the constant displacement through military defeat of daimyo and their retainers at the top and the need for those below to fill out the positions evacuated above them. The kumi method of securing the loyalty of retainers to the daimyo through intermediary group leaders (kumigashira) may be thought of as something of a transition system. Retaining some features of the previous practice of independent enfeoffment, it nonetheless yielded increasingly to the direct interference of the daimyo.
Within the domain at large, also, the vertical chain of fiscal or loyalty relationships between enfeoffed proprietor (jito) and subordinate cultivator (myashu), were beginning to give way to large, horizontally structured, functional class relationships between the "daimyo's men" (kashin) and groups such as farmers, merchants, and artisans.25 This change was accompanied by the increasing reliance on class or group legislation and the use of bureaucratic methods of military and civil administration to replace the older reliance on personal allegiances and kinship ties. Hideyoshi's social policy was to a large extent an extension of these trends. In particular, by taking leadership in carrying out a nation-wide cadastral reassessment, he laid the foundation for a new system of rural administration and taxation. It is to these new techniques of political and military organization that we can attribute the success of the shokuh6-daimy6 in recruiting armies of tens of thousands and in building and maintaining citadels of grandiose size. Bizen saw not only the erection of a great castle at Okayama but an intensive resurvey of the land and an accompanying reordering of the agricultural population under the Ukida.28 legal issues involved in the transfer of authority from the Ashikaga Shogun's consent to the "red seal" of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi has yet to be made. 24This is revealed in the structure of the Ukida house rolls. See especially: Ukida CheZnagon Hideie Kyo kashi chigy6ch6.
25Disregarding the controversy over whether the resulting condition should be interpreted as more "feudalistic" than the previous situation, Japanesc studies havc agrecd upon the importance of ccrtain I63 and I67 (1954) . 26 For studies of the effects of the reorganization of the land system under the Ukida see Kanai Madoka, "Shokuho6-ki ni okeru Bizen" ["Bizen during the Shokuho Period"], Chihoshi kenkygi, XLII (I59), 9-20; Shibata Hajime, "Sengoku dogos5 to Taik6 kenchi" ["The Sengoku Local Gentry and Hideyoshi's Cadastral Survey"], Rekishi ky5iku, VI, No. 8 (I958), 5263. way to a system of military statuses which led to a civil and military bureaucracy. Loyalty was becoming a principle rather than a private commitment.29
Changes of a similar sort affected the lower levels of society in Bizen. Under the impact of Confucian theory, the people (tami) were distinguished by class or function and placed under broad legal codes.30 For the farmers especially, the change from personal indenture to membership in the village as taxpaying tenants of the daimyo was a major change. After i6oo in Bizen, first the direct hold of the samurai, then of the shoya or village heads, over the villagers was replaced by a bureaucratic system of local government.31 It has been claimed that the strict class structure adopted by Hideyoshi and perfected by the Tokugawa constituted a "refeudalization" of Japanese society. Somewhat the reverse is probably closer to the truth. For the establishment of legally defined statuses (mibun) freed many sectors of Japanese society from the more restrictive and more personally conceived relationships based on private vassalage or indenture.32 These trends were not, of course, uniformly characteristic of all Japan. They constituted, however, the dominant pattern of the institutional change which accompanied the rise of the daimyo of Tokugawa times. Moreover, they involved changes not easily made nor successfully carried out in most of Japan until well into the Tokugawa age. In fact, the Tokugawa daimyo did not mature institutionally until at least I700.
The Sengoku age was indeed a time of significant social change in Japan, but not simply of the capricious kind implied by the phrase ge-toku-jd. Bizen saw not only the rise and fall of a procession of military houses, but also a radical change in the methods of local government and in the structure of relationships which joined government and society. In this the daimyo were both participants and products. i. At the highest level of political organization, that which provided the sanctions for exercise of power, Bizen passed from the shaky jurisdictional authority of the shugo-daimyJ, resting on uncertain military support and a weak legacy from the imperial tradition, to a nearly absolute authority vested in the daimyo by virtue of the shogunal charter (shuinjo), the imperial consent, and Confucian principles of morally exercised authority.
2. At the level of the organization of power, Bizen passed from the system of extended family relationships, utilized by the shugo-daimy&, to the Sengoku system of decentralized direct enfeoffment, to the military group (kumi) system of the Okayama Shishi, vols. III and IV, for the most extensive published sources on Okayama legislation. 31 Hamp6 Kenkyiikai, op. cit., I, i86, 263; Kanai Madoka, "Ojoya no gy6seki kuiki ni tsuite-Bizenhan no baai" ["On the Administrative Jurisdiction of the o3joya-The Case of Bizen-han"], Shigaku zasshi, LXII, No. i (Jan., 1953) , 66-71. 32Nakamura Kichiji, in his article "Kokudaka seido to h6kensei" (cited in note 7) has recently reversed the dominant academic trend in Japan led by Araki and Miyagawa who have taken the stand that the Tokugawa period brought a true serfdom to the Japanese peasant and therefore represents the final attainment of feudalism in Japan. Nakamura has emphasized the many "non-feudal" aspects of the Tokugawa political and social structure.
